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SUPREME COURT REVIEW
If the situation arose where no individual could
answer the interrogatories without subjecting
himself to a real and appreciable risk of self-
incrimination,"3 the civil discovery could be post-
poned until the termination of the criminal
action.24
Since, in Kordel, it was never claimed that there
was not an authorized person who could answer
the interrogatories without the possibility of
self-incrimination, the Court felt it unnecessary
to utilize procedures to delay the civil action. Of
11 Prior to 1948, Rule 33 provided that:
Any party may serve upon any adverse party writ-
ten interrogatories to be answered..., if the party
served is a public or private corporation or a part-
nership or association, by any officer thereof compe-
tent to testify in its behalf. (emphasis added)
It currently reads "by any officer or agent." Since an
agent need not be a corporate officer, it would be the
exception if a corporation could not appoint a person
free from possible self-incrimination to answer the inter-
rogatories. The agent need not have personal knowledge,
but regardless of who the individual is, the answers must
respond to the corporate knowledge and not necessarily
to the knowledge of the individual making the answer.
United States v. 42 Jars... "Bee Royale Capsules,"
264 F.2d 666, 670 (3d Cir. 1959); Segarra v. Waterman
Steamship Corp., 41 F.R.D. 245, 248 (D. Puerto Rico
1966).
14 At the time of Kordd, Rule 30(b) of the FEDERAL
RuLEs ox C v PRoCEDuRE provided in part:
After notice is served for taking a deposition by
oral examination, upon motion seasonably made by
any party or by the person to be examined and
upon notice and for good cause shown, the court in
which the action is pending may make an order
that the deposition shall not be taken. ...
Rule 30 was amended on March 30, 1970, to be effective
on July 1, 1970. The relevant material is now found in
Rules 30(d) and 26(c). See Dienstag v. Bronsen, 49
F.R.D. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Paul Harrigan & Sons v.
Enterprise Animal Oil Co., 14 F.R.D. 333 (E.D. Pa.
1953).
particular interest is the extent to which public
policy influenced the Court's refusal to grant a
deferment.
The public interest in protecting consumers
throughout the Nation from misbranded drugs
requires prompt action by the agency charged
with responsibility for administration of the federal
food and drug laws. But a rational decision whether
to proceed criminally against those responsible
for the misbranding may have to await considera-
tion of a fuller record than that before the agency
at the time of the civil seizure of the offending prod-
ucts. It would stultify enforcement of federal
law to require a governmental agency such as the
FDA invariably to choose either to forgo recom-
mendation of a criminal prosecution once it seeks
civil relief or to defer civil proceedings pending
the ultimate outcome of a criminal trial2 5
Indeed, this statement may direct us to the reason
why the original court failed to recognize the self-
incrimination inherent in the interrogatories.
In an area such as food and drugs, where constant
control is so necessary, not only is it desirable
to proceed on both the civil and criminal fronts as
quickly as possible, but even more desirable to win
in both litigations. If this was the attitude of the
court when the interrogatories were ordered to be
answered, it would indicate judgment by the
bench before disclosure of the facts. Furthermore,
does not such judicial action virtually destroy
the efficacy of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion? It is not just the guilty defendant who is
affected; an innocent party may be also be com-
pelled to convict himself.
25 397 U.S. at 11.
FIRST AMENDMENT-FREE SPEECH
Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970)
Schacht v. United States' dealt with the right of
an amateur actor to wear the uniform of the
United States Army in a theatrical production
critical of the government's military and foreign
policies. Petitioner Schacht, wearing parts of a
U.S. Army uniform,2 participated in a street skit
in front of an armed forces induction center. The
skit was designed to "expose the evil of the
1398 U.S. 58 (1970).
2 Id. at 59 n. 2.
American presence in Vietnam." I The nature of
the skit and Schacht's role in it were described by
the court of appeals as follows:
The skit was composed of three people. There
was Schacht who was dressed in a uniform and cap.
A second person was wearing 'military colored'
coveralls. The third person was outfitted in typical
Viet Cong apparel. The first two men carried water
pistols. One of them would yell, 'Be an able Amen-
a Id. at 60.
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can,' and then they would shoot the Viet Cong
with their pistols. The pistols expelled a red liquid
which, when it struck the victim, created the im-
pression that he was bleeding. Once the victim fell
down the other two would walk up to him and ex-
claim, 'My God, this is a pregnant woman.'
Without noticeable variation this skit was re-
enacted several times during the morning of the
demonstration. 4
Subsequent to his participation in this skit, Schacht
was indicted for violation of 18 U.S.C. §702 (1964),
which imposes criminal sanctions upon any person
who "without authority [wears] the uniform or a
distinctive part thereof... of any of the armed
forces of the United States." 5
At trial, petitioner defended his conduct on the
ground that he was authorized to wear the uniform
under the provisions of 10 U.S.C. §772(f) (1964),
which provides:
While portraying a member of the Army, Navy,
Air Force, or Marine Corps, an actor in a theatrical
or motion picture production may wear the uniform
of that armed force if the portrayal does not tend to
discredit that armed force. [Emphasis added]
He contended that this section protected his
conduct as a matter of law, since he was engaged
in a theatrical production. He argued that the last
clause of the provision did not take his conduct
outside of the section since it was an unconstitu-
tional restriction on free speech and was therefore
void. Schacht argued in the alternative that §702
was unconstitutional as applied to his case. Schacht
was convicted, however, and the judge imposed
the maximum sentence."
On appeal Schacht raised the same issues. The
court of appeals dealt with both issues as a single
contention, saying that
by regulating the wearing of armed forces uniforms,
the United States has on this occasion restricted
their [petitioners Schacht's and Smith's] constitu-
tional right to peaceably demonstrate and speak
on topics that are unpleasant to the majority of
citizensY
After mentioning Schacht's contention that he was
covered by §772(f), the court disregarded it and
proceeded to consider §702.
4 United States v. Smith, 414 F.2d 630, 632 (5th Cir.
1969).
5 The maximum sentence is a $50 fine and six months
imprisonment.
6 398 U.S. at 59.
7 414 F.2d at 633.
The court of appeals labored over the problem
of speech versus conduct, citing many important
symbolic speech cases8 In denying Schacht's
argument that his conduct was protected by the
first amendment, the court set up a dichotomy
between acts which violate a statute and acts which
do not. The former was illustrated by G/boney v.
Empire & Ice Co., 9 where peaceful labor picketing
was found to be an inherent part of a "single and
integrated course of conduct" which violated
Missouri's anti-trust laws by forcing an ice com-
pany to deal only with union peddlers. 0 The
court upheld the injunction against the union's
picketing despite its claim that the picketing was
protected as "symbolic speech." An example of
acts which do not violate a statute was Tinker v.
Des Moines School Dist.,n where the wearing of
black armbands in a public high school violated
only a ban against such actions by the principal.
The Supreme Court ruled that the armband-
wearing was a type of symbolic act closely akin
to pure speech and falling within the protections
of the Free Speech Clause. Schacht's conduct,
however, was found to fall within the category
of acts which violate a statute and therefore fell
within the Gibowey rationale. The majority con-
cluded:
Prohibition of such conduct would not abridge
the constitutional liberty since such activity
bears no necessary relationship to the freedom to
speak, write, print or distribute information of
opinion."
Judge Goldberg of the Fifth Circuit concurred,14
relying upon O'Brien v. United States.2 In O'Brien,
the Supreme Court upheld the 1965 draft card
burning amendment, finding that it protected a
valid governmental interest. Although this statute
might impinge on one's freedom of speech, the
Court held that its chilling effect upon first amend-
ments rights was both indirect and necessary to the
protection of the valid governmental interest.6
8 E.g., Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S.
503 (1969); O'Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367
(1968); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S.
490 (1949).
9 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
10 Id. at 498.
11393 U.S. 503 (1969).
12 Id. at 505-506.
"414 F.2d at 636, quoting Schneider v. New Jersey,
308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
14Id.
15 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
16 Id. at 377-382.
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In his opinion, Goldberg held that O'Brien
dictated the constitutionality of §702 because the
statute "was not conceived in the suppression of
freedom of expression." 17 With these words,
Goldberg seized upon the O'Brien requirement
that the constitutionality of a statute depends
on its being only indirectly suppressive of ex-
pressive freedom; both he and the majority com-
pletely ignored O'Brien's additional requirement
that the suppression of first amendment freedoms
be necessary to the accomplishment of the govern-
mental interest. As the Court stated in O'Brien,
A government regulation is sufficiently justified if
it is within the constitutional power of the govern-
ment; if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest
is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential
to the furtherance of that interest.18
Isolation of the "governmental interest" which
§702 seeks to protect is the first step required in
analyzing the present case under the O'Brien test.
That interest might be broadly defined as pro-
tecting the reputation of the military in general.
But if such a broad definition is adopted, nearly
any impingement on first amendment freedoms
might be judicially swept into the category of the
"incidental." This would seem contrary to the
spirit of O'Brien's requirement that the impinge-
ment be "no greater than is essential." The
alternative solution, more in keeping with the
spirit of O'Brien, is to split the broad interest into
its component parts, some of which would seem
valid because they involve no direct impingement
upon first amendment rights. Examples of such
valid interests might be those of maintaining the
identity of the military and protecting its reputa-
tion for good discipline.
Splitting the broad governmental interest into
its component parts would result in the invalida-
tion of any which directly impinged on first amend-
ment rights. Thus the military's general reputa-
tion depends in part upon whether the wars it is
involved in are considered "just" by the citizenry.
Protecting what might be termed the military's
"political" reputation would dearly be an invalid
state interest because it would directly impinge
upon first amendment rights.
It should be at once apparent that none of the
17 414 F.2d at 638.
18 391 U.S. at 377 (emphasis added).
above valid governmental interests was placed in
jeopardy by Schacht's conduct. His wearing of
the uniform did not threaten the reputation of the
military for good discipline; nor did it jeopardize
the government's interest in maintaining the
military's separate identity. These interests would
only have been placed in danger had there been a
reasonable probability that those who observed
Schacht's conduct would have mistaken him for
an actual member of the armed forces. As the
Supreme Court held in this case, Schacht was
clearly engaged in a fictitious portrayal. No
reasonable observer could have mistaken him for
anything but what he was: an actor engaged in
an amateur theatrical production.
Because Schacht's conduct did not endanger
any valid state interest, it would seem clear under
O'Brien that the application of §702 to his conduct
was not "essential to the furtherance of that
interest."
Section 702 does not stand alone, however.
Among the exceptions to it is 10 U.S.C. §772(f),
which Schacht claimed as a defense. The appellate
court's only discussion of that section was in
connection with Schacht's appeal of the finding
that the language of it was "amply dear." '
The Fifth Circuit panel failed to consider at all
whether, as a matter of law, Schacht's course of
conduct was a "theatrical production" within
the meaning of that section. It also did not specif-
ically rule on the constitutionality of the proviso
"if the portrayal does not tend to discredit that
armed force." If his acts qualified as a "theatrical
production" under §772(f), he could only be
convicted if he said something which discredited
the military. His speech while wearing the uniform
would be the gravamen of the offense, not the
simple fact that he wore a uniform. This is a pure
speech issue, not a symbolic speech issue.
Unlike the court of appeals decision, the Supreme
Court addressed itself both to whether Schacht's
conduct constituted a "theatrical production"
and to the constitutionality of the aforementioned
proviso "if the portrayal does not tend to dis-
credit that armed force." After disposing of a
procedural issue brought up by the government,0
19 414 F.2d at 636.
20 The government contended that the Court lacked
jurisdiction over Schacht's case because he had filed his
petition for certiorari 101 days late. Mr. justice Black
found Supreme Court Rule 22(2), which governs the
filing of petitions for certiorari, no obstacle:
Rule 22(2) contains no language that calls for so
harsh an interpretation.... The procedural rules
[Vol. 61
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the Court quickly rejected, as a matter of law, the
government's contention that Schacht had not
been engaged in a "theatrical production" within
the meaning of 10 U.S.C. §772(f) and was thereby
excluded from its protection. The Court said in
part:
Here, the record shows without dispute the prepa-
ration and repeated presentation by amateur actors
of a short play designed to create in the audience
an understanding of and opposition to our partici-
pation in the Vietnam war ... We cannot believe
that when Congress wrote out a special exception
for theatrical productions it intended to protect
only a narrow and limited category of profession-
ally protected plays.n
This interpretation of "theatrical production"
is an important change in the meaning of the
statute. As Justice Black himself pointed out, the
predecessor of §772(f) referred to an actor "in
any playhouse or theater or in moving-picture
films." 2 The 1956 codification which produced
§772(f) was not intended to make substantive
changes in the law, but was intended only to make
the language dearer, more modem, and more
flexible.28 By extending the protection of this
section to petitioner Schacht's case, the majority
adopted by this Court for the orderly transaction
of its business are not jurisdictional and can be
relaxed by the Court in the exercise of its discretion
when the ends of justice so require. 398 U.S. at 64.
Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring, felt it necessary to
clarify and amplify the decision on this procedural issue.
Taglianetti v. United States, 394 U.S. 316 (1969), and
Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415 (1959), cited by
justice Black as authority for waiving Rule 22(2), did
not explain why the Court had the power of waiver over
the rule. The Court had held in other cases that it could
not waive time limitations set by statute. 398 U.S. at 65
n. 2. In Schacht, the time limit was set by a Supreme
Court Rule rather than a federal statute, so that 18
U.S.C. § 3772 (1964), an unqualified delegation of
power, allowed the Court to disregard a rule it promul-
gated itself. 398 U.S. at 68.
21398 U.S. at 61-62. Mr. justice Black noted:
Certainly theatrical productions need not always be
performed in buildings or even on a defined area
such as a conventional stage .... Since time im-
memorial outdoor theatrical performances, often
performed by amateurs, have played an important
part in the entertainment and education of the
people of the world.... It may be that the perfor-
mances were crude and amateurish and perhaps
unappealing, but the same thing can be said about
many theatrical performances. 398 U.S. at 61-62.
22 Id. at 60 n. 3.23Id. Justice Black referred to the legislative history
of the code, especially the statement of Senator
O'Mahoney, 102 CONG. REc. 13944 (July 23, 1956), the
chairman of the drafting committee, when the code
came to the floor of the Senate.
substantially changed the meaning of the old law,
but without delineating the scope of the term
"theatrical production." It said only that Congress
could not have intended that Schacht's type of
"theatrical production" be given no protection, 4
The Court then considered petitioner's con-
tention that the last clause of §772(f), which
authorizes the wearing of the uniform only "if the
portrayal does not tend to discredit that armed
force," must be stricken because it imposes an
unconstitutional restraint on free speech. Schacht's
performance was conceded to be critical of the
armed forces, so he would have had no defense
against §702 if that last clause were found to be
valid. The Court's conclusion was:
In light of our earlier finding that the skit in which
Schacht participated was a "theatrical perform-
ance" . . it follows that his conviction can be
sustained only if he can be punished for speaking
out against the role of our Army in Vietnam.
Clearly punishment for this reason would be an
unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech.
The final clause of §772(f) ... leaves Americans
free to praise the war in Vietnam but can send
persons like Schacht to prison for opposing it....
To preserve the constitutionality of §772(f) that
final clause must be striken from the section. 5
Accordingly, the conviction was reversed.
Mr. Justice White, who was joined by The Chief
justice and Mr. justice Stewart, concurred in the
Court's judgment, agreeing that
Congress cannot constitutionally distinguish
between those theatrical performances which
do and those which do not "tend to discredit"
the military, in authorizing persons not on active
duty to wear a uniform.2 6
He disagreed with the majority's holding that,
as a matter of law, the petitioner had been engaged
in a theatrical performance.
justice White first defined the term "theatrical
production," something the majority neglected
to do. justice White's proposed test was
whether or not, considering all the circumstances
of the performance, an ordinary observer would
have thought he was seeing a fictitious portrayal
rather than a piece of reality.Y
This is a practical test, since it depends on what
24 Id. at 62.
25 Id. at 61-62.
26 Id. at 69.
.27 Id. at 70.
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the actor does rather than where he does it. The
test subsumes a more general case than the ob-
vious case of the formal theatrical presentation,
which accords with the desire of the majority to
broaden the coverage of the exemption in §772(f).
justice White wished to have the jury deter-
mine as a matter of fact whether Schacht's course
of conduct fell within this definition.28 But when
two people in military clothing squirt a third in
Viet Cong clothing with red dye on a Houston
street in front of an armed forces induction center,
no reasonable man could find this to be "a piece of
reality" rather than "a fictitious portrayal."
The "piece of reality" is in Viet Nam, not in
Houston. Thus, there is no question of fact here,
and it should not be put to a jury.2'
Justice White arrived at his result on the
grounds that the trial court's instructions were
in error. He noted that the jury in convicting
Schacht might have found either 1) that he was
not engaged in a theatrical performance, or 2) that
he was in a theatrical production which discredited
the military."° Since the latter finding would
necessarily violate Schacht's first amendment
privilege, it would be constitutionally impermis-
sible. And since there was a general verdict, it
28 Id.
29 In view of current public disfavor of war protestors
who "hide behind" the protections of the first amend-
ment, it goes against good policy for the Court to
remand a case like this one unnecessarily. The propen-
sity of jurors to react favorably and unfavorably to the
personalities and appearance of defendants is discussed
in Kalven and Zeisel, The American Jury (1966).
30 398 U.S. at 70.
was impossible to determine upon which of the
two instructions his conviction bad been based.
Therefore, White felt constrained to reverse the
conviction.9 '
The Supreme Court did not reach the symbolic
speech issue. Had it done so, it might very well
have reached the same result and reversed. With-
out the statutory authorization of 10 U.S.C.
Section 772(f), Section 702 of 18 U.S.C. would
probablybe overly broad as applied, under O'Brien,
if it had been utilized to prevent actors from
portraying military personnel. Under the Fifth
Circuit's reasoning, and absent §772(f), all actors
would be prohibited from'using military uniforms
even though their conduct endangered no valid
governmental interest. Hence, the Supreme Court
might well have found this situation impermissible
under the first amendment.
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit
on the narrower ground that it had failed to take
Schacht's statutory defense into consideration.
Since the symbolic speech issue was not reached
at all, Schacht will have little bearing on future
symbolic speech cases. It does represent, however,
a continuing preservation of the right to dissent
by the Supreme Court.
"1 Justice White here referred to Stromberg v. Cali-
fornia, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), one of the first symbolic
speech cases, which was similarly reversed because one
of the three alternative grounds for conviction for a
violation of the California "red flag" law was found to
be unconstitutional. All three were combined in the
judge's instructions, and a general verdict was handed
down by the jury.
Editor's Note
The unsigned student comments in the June issue of the present volume of the Journal, previously un-
acknowledged, were prepared by Glori M. Michelotti, Norman P. Jeddeloh, and Jon E. Steffensen.
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